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Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics of Trust Games with Asymmetric Parameters
Ik Soo Lim∗
School of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering,
Bangor University, Dean Street, Bangor, Gwynedd, LL57 1UT, UK
(Dated: December 29, 2020)
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with trustworthy actions are crucial to successful
and prosperous societies. The Trust Game has been widely used to quantitatively study trust and
trustworthiness, involving a sequential exchange between an investor and a trustee. The determin-
istic evolutionary game theory predicts no trust and no trustworthiness whereas the behavioural
experiments with the one-shot anonymous Trust Game show that people substantially trust and
respond trustworthily. To explain these discrepancies, previous works often turn to additional
mechanisms, which are borrowed from other games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma. Although these
mechanisms lead to the evolution of trust and trustworthiness to an extent, the optimal or the most
common strategy often involves no trustworthiness. In this paper, we study the impact of asymmet-
ric demographic parameters (e.g. different population sizes) on game dynamics of the Trust Game.
We show that, in weak-mutation limit, stochastic evolutionary dynamics with the asymmetric pa-
rameters can lead to the evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness without any additional
mechanisms in well-mixed finite populations. Even full trust and near full trustworthiness can be the
most common strategy. These results are qualitatively different from those of the previous works.
Our results thereby demonstrate rich evolutionary dynamics of the asymmetric Trust Game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Prosocial behaviour is an important aspect of human
interactions. Emergence and maintenance of prosocial
behaviours among self-interested individuals is a consid-
erable focus of research across various disciplines includ-
ing physics [1][2][3][4][5][6]. For instance, the evolution
of cooperation in social dilemma situations such as Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD) has attracted lots of attention.
Evolutionary game theory is widely used to provide a
theoretical framework to study the evolution of prosocial
behaviours or strategies, where successful strategies are
spread by reproduction in genetic evolution and imita-
tion in cultural evolution [7][8][9]. To explain the evolu-
tion of cooperation that is seemingly irrational and al-
truistic, for instance, various mechanisms have been pro-
posed; network reciprocity [10][11], reputation [12][13],
and uncertainty-led stochastic dynamics [14][15], etc.
Trusting in others and reciprocating that trust with
trustworthy actions are central components of success-
ful social and economic interactions among humans.
Higher levels of trusting and trustworthy behaviours
have been associated with more efficient judicial systems,
higher quality government bureaucracies, lower corrup-
tion, greater financial development, and better economic
outcomes among other benefits for the society [16].
To study trust and trustworthiness in quantitative
manners, the Trust Game (TG) has been widely used
in various disciplines [16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23]. The
TG involves a sequential exchange between an investor
and a trustee without any contract to enforce agreements
[19]. The investor starts with a stake of one monetary
unit and invests or transfers some fraction of it to the
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trustee, which measures a degree of trust. To represent
the value created by interactions based on trust, the in-
vested amount is multiplied by a factor. The trustee then
returns a certain fraction of the enhanced investment to
the investor, which measures a degree of trustworthiness.
According to the logic of the classical economic theory,
rational self-interest leads to no trust and no trustwor-
thiness in a one-shot anonymous TG; a self-interested
trustee would not return anything and, therefore, a self-
interested investor would not invest [16]. Thus, the po-
tential gains of trust and exchange are lost. Determin-
istic models of evolutionary game theory yield the same
outcome as the dooming prediction of classical economic
theory [18]. According to behavioural experiments with
the TG, however, people are willing to trust and recipro-
cate trust; investors make transfers and trustees return
substantial amounts to investors [16].
To explain this discrepancy between the theoretical
predictions and the behavioural experiment results, ad-
ditional mechanisms have been proposed in the frame-
work of evolutionary game theory. Reputation about
trustees can boost the evolution of trust and trustworthi-
ness [17][24][25]. In the limit of weak selection, stochas-
tic evolutionary dynamics due to randomness in finite
populations can evolve some degrees of trust and trust-
worthiness [17][18]. Allowing interactions and imitation
with only neighbouring players, the networked structure
of populations boosts the evolution of trust and trust-
worthiness, selecting for more trusting and trustworthy
strategies than well-mixed populations [18]. Note that
these mechanisms have been originally proposed to evolve
other prosocial behaviours such as cooperation in the PD
game.
Compared to the symmetric games (e.g. PD) which
have been extensively studied with single-population






























two different roles of the game players, each of which has
its own set of strategies; one for an investor and the other
for a trustee. Despite this asymmetric nature, however,
the TG is often symmetrised [18][20]. In the symmetric
TG, each player takes turns playing investor and trustee
roles and, thus, a strategy of a player has two compo-
nents; one for an investor role and the other, a trustee.
One of the key motivations behind the symmetrisation
is that the TG can be studied with a single-population
model and thus the mechanisms to evolve prosocial be-
haviours in other games can be used for the TG as well
[18].
Due to the asymmetric nature of the TG, however, a
two-population model is more natural for it; one popula-
tion for investors and the other for trustees, each player
having a single role. The TG is then played between a
player from the investor population and a player from
the trustee population, whereas imitation takes place be-
tween players in the same populations. Although there
were previous attempts for this, they are limited or not
asymmetric enough in the sense that symmetric param-
eters were used (e.g. the same selection strengths and
population sizes between the two populations) [17][18].
Studying both the single- and two-population models,
it was even asserted that the two-population model led
to the same prediction as that of the single-population
model [18]. However, this conclusion is premature in that
the two-population model was still based on the symmet-
ric parameters. It missed potentially richer evolutionary
dynamics stemming from the asymmetric parameters be-
tween the populations.
In this paper, we introduce a two-population model
of the TG with asymmetric demographic parameters.
We show that stochastic evolutionary dynamics with
the asymmetric parameters yields evolutionary outcomes
richer than those of the symmetric parameters or the
single-population models. In particular, a combination
of stronger selection in the investor population and weak
selection in the trustee population can lead to the evolu-
tion of high trust and high trustworthiness without any
additional mechanisms in well-mixed populations. Even
the most common strategy can involve high trustwor-
thiness. These outcomes are significantly different from
the previous works on the TG, which predicted that null
trustworthiness is the most common.
II. MODEL AND METHODS
A. Trust Games
In the TG, a pair of players have an investor–trustee
transaction. The investor starts with an initial stake of
one unit and transfers some fraction 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 of it to
the trustee. The trustee receives the transferred amount
multiplied by a factor b > 1, the latter of which rep-
resents the value generated by trust-based interactions.
The trustee then returns some fraction 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 of the
enhanced transfer amount pb to the investor. The pay-
offs of the investor and the trustee from a transaction are
respectively given by
πI(p, r) = 1− p+ pbr, πT (p, r) = pb(1− r).
The fitness of a player playing the TG is given by
f = 1 + βπ,
where β denotes the selection strength and π, the mean
payoff of a player.
B. Moran Process
We consider the stochastic evolutionary game dynam-
ics in finite populations. For the evolutionary process, we
use the Moran process [26]. In each time step, an indi-
vidual is picked at random to switch strategy. The focal
individual imitates a strategy of another individual that
is picked with probability proportional to fitness. With
probability u, a mutation occurs and the focal individual
instead switches to a random strategy. The Moran pro-
cess has been used as a model of biological evolution as
well as imitation learning [27].
C. Discretisation of Strategy Space
We discretise the continuous strategies 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ r ≤ 1 in increments of 1/Lp and 1/Lr, respectively,
where Lp and Lr are positive integers; p ∈ SI = {pm|m =
1, 2, . . . , Lp +1} = {0, 1/Lp, 2/Lp, . . . , (Lp−1)/Lp, 1} for
investors and r ∈ ST = {rn|n = 1, 2, . . . , Lr + 1} =
{0, 1/Lr, 2/Lr, . . . , (Lr − 1)/Lr, 1} for trustees. With
the discretisation, we can use methods assuming discrete
strategies such as weak-mutation limit.
D. Weak-Mutation Limit
In a finite population, with no mutation, imitation-led
stochastic dynamics yields fixation and, thus, the popu-
lation state becomes ‘pure’ or homogeneous; i.e. all indi-
viduals in the population use the same strategy.
With mutation, we use the weak-mutation limit u→ 0,
which is a common assumption in evolutionary game the-
ory [28][29][30][2][31]. A population consists of one or two
types of strategies at any time; a single mutant in the oth-
erwise pure population will either perish or completely
take over the resident population before another mutant
occurs. The evolutionary process, therefore, simplifies
to an embedded dynamics over just the pure population
states {s1, . . . , si, . . . , sK}, where si = (pm, rn) ∈ SI⊗ST
and K = |SI |×|ST |. More specifically, we use the scheme
i = (m−1)|ST |+n, 1 ≤ m ≤ |SI | and 1 ≤ n ≤ |ST |. In the
embedded dynamics, a population transitions between
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the pure states with probabilities determined by the rel-
ative frequency of mutant appearance and the fixation
probabilities of these mutants [28]. Given the stochas-
tic dynamics, what we are interested in is the stationary
distribution λ = (λ1, . . . , λK), i.e. the proportion of time
spent in each of pure states in the long run or, equiva-
lently, the stationary abundance of these discrete strate-
gies. The stationary distribution λ is uniquely deter-
mined and can be obtained by solving a left eigenequa-
tion
λΛ = λ, (1)
where Λ is a transition matrix for an ergodic Markov
chain over the pure state space {s1, . . . , sK}. The entries
of the K ×K matrix Λ are given by




where µij is the probability that, in pure state i, a single
mutant of type j arises and ρij is the fixation probability
that this mutant takes over the resident population, lead-
ing to pure state j. Note that, with the weak-mutation
limit µij → 0, every diagonal entry Λii is non-negative.
E. Single-Population Formulation
We start with a single-population model of the sym-
metric TG in the weak-mutation limit, whereas a previ-
ous work studied the TG in a weak-selection limit but
not a weak-mutation limit [18]. In a population of size
N , each player can be both an investor and a trustee with
equal probability. In other words, given a pair of players,
they play the TG, each taking turns playing investor and
trustee roles. We specify a player’s strategy as a tuple
s = (p, r) ∈ SI ⊗ ST . The (mean) payoff πs(s′) that a
player with strategy s = (p, r) gets from an interaction












In the weak-mutation limit, there are at most two types
of strategies present in a population. Let si and sj denote
resident and mutant strategies, respectively, where 1 ≤
i, j ≤ K. The mean payoff πi(k) of an i-player and πj(k)
of a j-player in a population consisting of N−k i-players















For i 6= j, the probability that, in a population of i-
players, a single mutant of j-player reaches fixation is
given by










where fi(k) and fj(k) are the fitness of an i-player and a
j-player, respectively, when there are k j-players in the
population [15]. In the embedded dynamics, thus, ρij is
the probability that pure state i switches to pure state j
given a single mutant of j-player arising in a population













for i 6= j.
F. Two-Population Formulation
In the asymmetric TG, each individual plays a single
role of either an investor or a trustee, exclusively. Thus,
we have two populations; one consisting of investors and
the other of trustees. Interactions of playing the TG are
inter-population events, whereas imitations of strategies
are intra-population events. An individual from the in-
vestor population plays the TG with an individual from
the trustee population. An investor imitates the strat-
egy of another investor, whereas a trustee imitates that
of another trustee.
1. Weak-mutation Limit
Under the weak-mutation limit, there are at most three
types of strategies in the two-population system. Both
populations are in pure states unless in a transition pe-
riod due to a rare mutation. If a mutant arises in one of
the populations, the extinction or fixation of it is settled
before another mutant appears either in the same or the
other population.
Unlike the single-population model, the payoffs of res-
ident and mutant strategies in one population are con-
stant during the extinction-fixation period [29]. This is so
because the payoffs of them depend on the state of the
other population that is in the same pure state during
the extinction-fixation period. Hence, mean payoff πl of
a resident player and π′l of a mutant player in population
l ∈ {I, T} are given by
πI = πI(p, r), π
′
I = πI(p
′, r) for an investor mutation,
πT = πT (p, r), π
′
T = πT (p, r
′) for a trustee mutation.
The fitness of a player in population l is given by
fl(p, r) = 1 + βlπl(p, r),
where βl is selection strength in population l.
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2. Fixation Probabilities
Note that pure state si = (pm, rn) ∈ SI ⊗ ST of the
two-population system is a tuple of pure state pm ∈ SI
of the investor population and pure state rn ∈ ST of the
trustee population. The embedded dynamics over pure
states of the two-population system is formally equivalent
to that of the single population in the sense that each of
them can be viewed as the dynamics over the same finite
strategy space SI ⊗ ST . They differ only in values of the
transition matrix entries.
The frequency-independent selection in the two-
population model allows us to use the well-known for-
mula for fixation probability under the Moran process
[27]. The fixation probability that, in population l oth-
erwise pure for a resident strategy of fitness fl, a single






1− (fl/f ′l )
Nl
for f ′l 6= fl
1
Nl
for f ′l = fl,
where Nl is the size of population l.
3. Transition Matrix
For i 6= j, the (one-step) transition probabilities Λij in










ρT (fT (pm, rn), fT (pm, rn′)) for rn 6= rn′
Λi(pm,rn)j(pm′ ,rn′ ) = 0 for pm 6= pm′ and rn 6= rn′ ,
(3)
where ul and gl are mutation rate per indivdiual and
generation time in population l ∈ {I, T}, respectively.
Note that the weak-mutation limit in the two-
population model constrains a one-step transition in spe-
cific ways. There are only |SI |+ |ST | − 1 states available
for a one-step transition from a pure state si = si(pm,rn)
since mutation exclusively occurs in either the investor
or trustee populations but not both under the weak-
mutation limit. This contrasts to the single-population
model, where there are |SI | × |ST | − 1 states available
for the transition without the constraint. More impor-
tantly, in the two-population model, asymmetric parame-
ters are naturally set since each population l has its own
parameters (Nl, ul, gl, βl and |Sl|) and their values can
be different from corresponding values of the other pop-
ulation, in general. The asymmetry in these parameters
can lead to stationary distributions qualitatively differ-
ent from those stemming from symmetric parameters or
the single-population model.
4. Weak-selection Limit
We can expand the fixation probability ρ(f, f ′) by Tay-
lor series














where 4π = π′ − π denotes the difference of mutant
(mean) payoff π′ and resident payoff π. Note that 4π
is constant during the extinction-fixation period. For














l ) is then
a function of βlNl. In other words, the product βlNl ef-
fectively acts as a single parameter as far as the transition
probability is concerned.
III. RESULTS
A. Symmetric Games in One Population
We first present the stationary distribution of a single-
population model of the symmetric TG (Fig. 1 (a)). The
modal (or most common) strategy in the distribution is
(a tuple of) low trust and null trustworthiness. The mean
strategy is mid trust and low trustworthiness. A strategy
is said to be selected for or favoured by selection if its
frequency (or abundance) exceeds 1/K that would be the
frequency of each strategy if there were no differences in
fitness between the strategies [32][33][34][35][36][37]. The
strategies favoured by selection (i.e. those more frequent
























































FIG. 1. (Top row) The stationary distribution of the pure
population states. The times ‘×’ sign denotes the mode of
the stationary distribution and the plus ‘+’ sign, the mean.
(Bottom) The strategies favoured by selection, i.e. those more
frequent than 1/K are in black. (a) The single-population
model of the symmetric TG. N = 100, β = 0.05, u = 10−3,
b = 3, and K = |SI | × |ST | = 112 = 121. (b) The two-
population model of the asymmetric TG with symmetric pa-
rameters. NI = NT = 50, βI = βT = 0.05, uI = uT = 10
−3,
gI = gT = 1, and |SI | = |ST | = 11. With the symmetric pa-
rameters, even the two-population model yields evolutionary
outcomes similar to those of the single-population model.
B. Asymmetric Games in Two Populations
For the two-population model of the asymmetric TG,
we start with symmetric parameters as a baseline. All the
parameters of generation times, mutation rates, selection
strengths, population sizes, and discretisation resolutions
are the same between the two populations (Fig. 1 (b)).
With the symmetric parameters, even the two-
population model of the asymmetric TG yields evolution-
ary outcomes similar to those of the single-population.
Note that the modal and mean strategies reveal a differ-
ent aspect of evolution. Specifically, while null trustwor-
thiness r = 0 is the modal strategy regardless of selec-
tion strengths βI = βT , low-to-mid trustworthiness r > 0
evolves on average for low selection strength (Fig. 2 and
3).
For asymmetric demographics parameters, we take the
all-else-equal approach in varying the parameters; val-
ues of a parameter differ between the two populations,
whereas the remaining parameter values are the same
between the populations [31].
1. Asymmetric Ratios of Mutation Rate to Generation
Time
A previous paper treated and varied mutation rate ul
and generation time gl, independently for the all-else-
equal comparison [31]. From the definition of the transi-
tion probability in Eq. (3), however, what matters is the
ratio ul/gl but not individuals of them. For the all-else-
equal comparison, thus, we treat and vary the ratio ul/gl
as if a single parameter. Compared to the symmetric
case, the asymmetric ratios (an order-of-magnitude dif-
ference) between the two populations do not yield sub-
stantial differences in the stationary distributions, espe-
cially, the mean strategy and the strategies favoured by
selection (Fig. 4). Thus, the asymmetry in the ratio of
mutation rate to generation time does not substantially
promote trust nor trustworthiness.
2. Asymmetric Selection Strengths
Asymmetric selection strengths can substantially pro-
mote the evolution of trust and trustworthiness. The
stationary distribution becomes multi-modal when the
selection strength in the investor population is stronger
than that in the trustee population (βI > βT ) and the
latter is weak (βT  1) (Fig.5). The modal strategy
is full trust and near full trustworthiness while the mean
strategy rises to mid trust and mid trustworthiness. Also,
high trust and mid-to-high trustworthiness are favoured
by selection. These outcomes of the boosted trust and
trustworthiness are substantially different from those of
the baseline with a unimodal distribution.
3. Asymmetric Population Sizes
Asymmetric population sizes can promote the evolu-
tion of trust and trustworthiness. When the population
size of trustees is substantially smaller than that of in-
vestors (NI  NT ), it leads to a multi-modal distri-
bution (Fig.6). Analogous to the asymmetric selection
strengths, trust and trustworthiness are boosted. The
mean strategy rises to mid trust and mid trustworthi-
ness, while high trust and mid-to-high trustworthiness
are favoured by selection.
4. Product of Selection Strength and Population Size
The product βlNl of selection strength and population
size can act as a single parameter, in effect. For weak
selection βl  1 and Nl  1, Nlρij is a function of βlNl
as seen in Eq.(4). Given the value of βlNl, in other words,
Nlρij is invariant even if each of βl and Nl varies. We
numerically demonstrate this invariance (Fig. 7). It also
leads to the invariance of transition probabilities and,




























































































FIG. 2. Varying selection strengths in the two-population model with the symmetric parameters. (a) Selection strength
βI = βT = 0.005. (b) βI = βT = 0.05. (c) βI = βT = 0.5. (d) βI = βT = 1.5. As the selection strength decreases (βI = βT → 0),
the mean strategy converges to mid trust and mid trustworthiness while more of high trust and mid trustworthiness are favoured
by selection. This contrasts to the modal strategy that involves null trustworthiness, regardless of the selection strength. The




















FIG. 3. Although evolution results in null trustworthy r = 0
for the modal strategy, it yields low-to-mid trustworthiness
for the mean strategy.
Given the value of the product, indeed, the stationary
distribution hardly varies for a wide range of population
size (and associated selection strength) (Fig. 8). When
selection acts stronger in the investor population than
the trustee population (βINI  βTNT ) and selection acts
weakly in the trustee population (βTNT < 1), it can lead
to the evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness.
The stronger selection among the investors (βINI →∞)
and the weaker selection among the trustees (βTNT → 0),
the higher trust and higher trustworthiness (Fig. 9).
An intuition for the evolution of high trust and high
trustworthiness can be built from the switching mono-
tonicity of an investor’s fitness. The fitness of an
investor increases with trust p if r > 1/b but de-
creases if r < 1/b. Under strong selection among in-
vestors, high trust is thus favoured for trustworthiness
higher than the threshold (r > 1/b) and low trust
for lower trustworthiness (r < 1/b). Even though
the fitness of a trustee decreases with trustworthiness
r, on the other hand, a wide range of trustworthiness
(from low to high) can be favoured under weak selec-
tion among trustees. We thus expect the evolution
of high-trust⊗ high-trustworthiness and low-trust⊗ low-
trustworthiness but not high-trust⊗ low-trustworthiness
nor low-trust⊗ high-trustworthiness (Fig. 10).
5. Asymmetric Discretisation
Asymmetric discretisation or resolution in strategy
space does not make a substantial difference, at least,
in the mean strategy and the strategies favoured by se-
lection (Fig. 11). Note that the modal frequency varies
or is not robust to both the asymmetric and symmetric
resolutions of strategy discretisation, whereas the mean
strategy and the strategies favoured by selection gener-
ally remain unchanged (Fig. 12).
6. Interference from the Ratio of Mutation Rate to
Generation Time
We also test out a possible interaction between the
asymmetric ratio ul/gl and the asymmetric product βlNl.















































































FIG. 4. Asymmetry in the ratio of mutation rate u to generation time g. (a) uI/gI = 10
−4, uT/gT = 10
−3. (b) uI/gI =
uT/gT = 10
−3. (c) uI/gI = 10
−3, uT/gT = 10
−4. Compared to that of the symmetric ratio in (b), the asymmetric ratios in
(a) and (c) do not yield a substantial difference in the mean strategy nor the strategies favoured by selection. The remaining















































































FIG. 5. Asymmetry in selection strength. (a) βI = 0.005, βT = 0.05. When the selection strength in the investor population is
weaker than that in the investor population, there is little difference compared to the symmetric case of (b). (b) βI = βT = 0.05.
(c) βI = 0.05, βT = 0.005. When the selection strength in the investor population is stronger than that in the investor population
and the latter is weak, the modal strategy is full trust and near full trustworthiness. The mean strategy also rises to mid trust
and mid trustworthiness while high trust and mid-to-high trustworthiness are favoured by selection. The remaining parameters













































































FIG. 6. Asymmetry in population size. (a) NI = 25, NT = 250. When the size of the investor population is smaller than that
of the trustee population, trustworthiness of the mean and strategies favoured by selection is lowered than that of the baseline
case of (b). (b) NI = NT = 50. (c) NI = 250, NT = 25. When the size of the trustee population is smaller, the stationary
distribution becomes multi-modal, including the one encompassing full trust and mid-to-high trustworthiness. High trust and























FIG. 7. NTρij is invariant given βTNT , unless the population
size NT is too small or the βTNT is too high. π and π
′ denote
the payoffs of the resident and the mutant, respectively. βI =
0.05, NI = 50.
to the asymmetric βlNl was demonstrated, holding ul/gl
symmetric. We now relax the all-else-equal constraint
and allows for asymmetry in both ul/gl and βlNl at the
same time. Despite the additional asymmetry, the gen-
eral outcome of high trust and high trustworthiness re-
mains unchanged (Fig. 13). In other words, ul/gl does
not have significant interaction with βlNl. Thus, our
main result that high trust and high trustworthiness is
evolved by a combination of stronger and weak selections
in the investor and the trustee populations is robust.
C. Individual-based Simulation of Moran Process
So far, all the results of Fig. 1 to 13 are obtained by
numerically solving the eigenequation (1). We also run
the individual-based simulations of the Moran process at
various mutations rates, while maintaining the asymme-
try between βINI and βTNT . The stationary distribution
obtained by solving the eigenequation associated with the
Markov chain Eq. (3) is compared with those obtained by
the simulations of the Moran process. With the asym-
metric parameters, the individual-based simulations lead
to the evolution of high trust and trustworthiness at the
low mutation rates (u = 10−4 and 10−3), as predicted by
the Markov chain (Fig. 14).
The individual-based simulation also enables us to ex-
amine the evolutionary dynamics of the Moran process
even at (relatively) high mutation rates, where the as-
sumption for the weak-mutation limit may not be met
for most of the time. At the mutation rate u = 10−2,
for instance, the populations are in pure or homogeneous
states only for 15% of the time, unlike the lower mutation
rates where they are in pure states for most of the time.
For that 15% of the time when the populations are in
pure states, however, high trust and trustworthiness still
evolve, matching the prediction of the Markov chain. In
other words, the weak-mutation limit approach well pre-
dicts the stationary distribution of pure state even at
high mutation rates if the pure states exist.
We can relax the examination of only the pure popula-
tion states. We instead monitor the most frequent strat-
egy in a population at a time or per generation. The pure
state is a special case of the most frequent strategy, where
there is only one (type of) strategy in a population at a



































































































FIG. 8. Invariance of stationary distributions under βTNT = 0.25 while varying NT . (a) NT = 10. (b) NT = 200. (c) NT = 500.


































































































FIG. 9. The stronger of the product βINI and the weaker of the product βTNT , the higher trust and trustworthiness evolve.
(a) βINI = 1, βTNT = 1. (b) βINI = 2.5, βTNT = 0.25. (c) βINI = 2.5, βTNT = 0.025. (d) βINI = 25, βTNT = 0.025.
frequent strategy and pure state are very similar since
each population is in pure states for most of the time. At
high mutation rates, each of the populations is hardly in
any pure states (but mostly in heterogeneous states) but
the most frequent strategy exists at any time. Surpris-
ingly, the distributions of the most frequent strategy at
high mutation rates are similar to those at low mutation
rates (Fig. 15). In other words, regardless of mutation
rates, the asymmetric parameters can evolve high trust
and trustworthiness as the most frequent strategy in the




































































































FIG. 10. The reason for the evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness under stronger and weak selection in the investor
and trustee populations, respectively. (a) βINI = 25, βTNT = 0.25. (b) The fitness of an investor increases with trust p if
trustworthiness r > 1/b = 1/3 and decreases if r < 1/b. Thus, higher p is selected for if r > 1/b and lower p if r < 1/b. (c)
Although the fitness of trustees decreases with r, the selection acts weak in the trustee population so that a wide range of
r (low to high) is selected for like neutral selection. Due to the combination of these, high-trust ⊗ high-trustworthiness and












































































FIG. 11. Asymmetry in the discretisation of strategy space. (a) |SI | = 7, |ST | = 21. (b) |SI | = |ST | = 11. (c) |SI | = 21, |ST | = 7.
In terms of the mean strategy and the strategies favoured by selection, there is little difference between asymmetric and
symmetric cases. Although the modal frequency varies, the trustworthiness of it is null. The remaining parameters are the





























































































FIG. 12. Different resolutions in discretised strategy space. (a) |SI | = |ST | = 3, (b) |SI | = |ST | = 7, (c) |SI | = |ST | = 13, (d)
|SI | = |ST | = 21. βINI = 2.5, βTNT = 0.25. Both the mean strategy and strategies favoured by selection generally remain














































































FIG. 13. Interactions between asymmetric ratio ul/gl and asymmetric product βlNl. (a) uI/gI = 0.1, uT/gT = 1. (b)
uI/gI = uT/gT = 1. (c) uI/gI = 1, uT/gT = 0.1. Given βINI = 2.5 and βTNT = 0.25, the asymmetric ratios do not
significantly interfere with the evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness, the latter of which is yielded by the asymmetric
product. The modal strategy can substantially change, though.
IV. DISCUSSION
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of the asymmetric
TG can yield the evolution of substantial trust and trust-
worthiness when demographic parameters between the
two populations are asymmetric. Specifically, a combi-
nation of stronger selection in the investor population
(i.e.βINI  βTNT ) and weak selection in the trustee
population (i.e.βTNT < 1) leads to the evolution of high
trust and high trustworthiness. Even full trust and near
































































































FIG. 14. The distributions of the pure state by the individual-based simulations of the Moran process. (a) The distribution
obtained by solving the eigenequation. The distributions are also obtained by the simulation of the Moran process at various
mutation rates (b) u = uI = uT = 10
−4, (c) 10−3, and (d) 10−2. The proportion of the simulation time/generations when
the populations are in the pure states are (b) 98%, (c) 82%, and (d) 15%. As the mutation rate increases, the chance of the
populations in pure states decreases. The distribution predicted by the Markov chain matches the distributions obtained by the
simulation well enough. For u = 10−1 (not shown), virtually no pure state is realised, but only a mixture of different strategies.
βI = 0.5, βT = 0.025, NI = 50 and NT = 10.
These predictions are qualitatively different from those
of previous work with single- and two-population mod-
els, where the most common strategy always involved
null trustworthiness [18]; enforcing the symmetric pa-
rameter values between the populations, the previous
two-population model of the asymmetric TG missed the
richer evolutionary dynamics that would stem from the
asymmetric parameters. To evolve non-zero trustworthi-
ness as the most common strategy in the symmetric TG,
previous works turned to additional mechanisms such as
reputation-based interactions [17][24][25]. It would apply
to only humans but not lower animals that lack high cog-
nitive complexity to process the reputation information.
However, we have demonstrated that it does not nec-
essarily require additional mechanisms or deterministic
causes. Life being a discrete phenomenon, the consequent
stochasticity may yield evolutionary outcomes that deter-
ministic models cannot [38]. For the asymmetric TG, we
show that the stochasticity combined with the asymmet-
ric demographic parameters suffices to yield high degrees
of trustworthiness as the most common strategy, which
is applicable to lower animals as well as humans.
We effectively reduce the number of demographic pa-
rameters necessary for studying the impact of their asym-
metry on evolutionary dynamics. A previous work inde-
pendently varied mutation rate, generation time, selec-
tion strength and population size for an asymmetric game
[31]. Since the transition probability is a function of the
ratio of mutation rate to generation time, one only needs
to treat and vary the ratio as if a single parameter but
not the two independent parameters. We can also treat
the product of selection strength and population size as
if a single parameter since transition probability can be
well approximated as a function of the product. Hence,
we reduce the number of parameters from four to two in
studying the effects of asymmetry in parameters. Note
that this reduction applies to two-population models of
asymmetric games in general.
We also investigate possible interactions between pa-
rameters. The all-else-equal approach is effective to pin-
point the parameter, asymmetry in which would signifi-
cantly alter the evolutionary outcome compared to that
of the symmetric case; all parameters except for one are
held equal and constant for the two populations [31].
However, the all-else-equal approach does not reveal pos-
sible interactions between the parameters. Indeed, the
condition of the all-else-equal may rarely be realised in
the uncontrolled real world. Relaxing the all-else-equal,
we consider all combinations of asymmetry in both the
ratio µl/gl and the product βlNl. We find that there
is no significant interaction between the ratio and the
product. Hence, we can conclude that the combination
of stronger selection in the investor population and weak





























































































FIG. 15. The distributions of the most frequent strategy in the populations by the same simulations of Fig. 14. (a) u = uI =
uT = 10
−4, (b) 10−3, (c) 10−2, and (d) 10−1. At low mutation rates (e.g.u = 10−4), the distributions of the most frequent
strategy and the pure state are virtually the same. At high mutation rates (e.g.u = 10−1), the distribution of the most frequent
strategy is still well defined, whereas the distribution of pure state is not since the populations are hardly in any pure states.
The distributions of the most frequent strategy are (qualitatively) similar to each other regardless of mutation rates. In other
words, the asymmetric parameters evolve high trust and trustworthiness regardless of mutation rates.
evolution of trust and trustworthiness regardless of the
other parameter.
Weak-selection limit is often assumed to analyti-
cally study the stochastic dynamics in finite popula-
tions [39][40]. The weak-selection limit was applied to
both the symmetric TG and the asymmetric TG [18];
only symmetric demographic parameters for the lat-
ter were considered, though. An alternative to weak-
selection limit is weak-mutation limit [28], which has
been widely used for single-population models of sym-
metric games [30][41][42][43][44]. The weak-mutation
limit for two-population models of asymmetric games has
been recently proposed [29]. To our best knowledge, our
work is the first application of the weak-mutation ap-
proach to the asymmetric TG. The weak-selection and
weak-mutation approaches complement each other in the
sense that the former has no restriction on mutation
rates, whereas the latter has no restriction on selection
strengths.
The mode of a stationary distribution would have a
less predictive meaning if the distribution is relatively
flat and wide; large deviations from it would be frequent
unlike a distribution sharply peaked at the mode. The
previous work on the TG used weak-selection limit to
analytically derive the mode [18]. Ironically, the weak-
selection limit flattens and widens the stationary distri-
bution significantly. The modal strategy from such a flat
distribution is of limited information since a wide range
of strategies significantly deviated from it can be selected
for or observed. The mean of a stationary distribution
well complements the mode especially when they are sub-
stantially different from each other. Our two-population
model with asymmetric parameters yields wide and mul-
timodal distributions. Although representing the highest
one, the mode of such a distribution represents only one
of the multiple peaks in it, offering less information espe-
cially when the strategies corresponding to those picks
substantially deviate from each other. On the other
hand, the mean better reflects all the peaks in that it
takes all of them into consideration. Also, the mean is
robust to the (resolution of) discretisation of continuous
strategies, whereas the mode is not. Unlike the previous
work not considering the mean [18], we believe that both
the mode and the mean had better be used together.
The evolution of high trust and high trustworthiness by
the asymmetric demographic parameters is robust to the
resolution or granularity of discretised strategies, regard-
less of symmetric or asymmetric resolution. In a sense,
the resolution reflects degrees of errors in perceiving con-
tinuous strategies; the lower resolution, the higher error
in imitation of continuous strategies. Hence, we can say
that the evolution of high trust and trustworthiness by
the asymmetric parameters is robust to the perception
error.
The one-step transitions in the embedded dynamics
over pure states in the two-population model are con-
14
strained; given pure state, it can transit to another pure
state that exclusively differs in either trust or trustwor-
thiness but not both. In the single-population model,
there is no such constraint; one-step transition to pure
state differing in both trust and trustworthiness is pos-
sible. It is one of the key differences between the single-
and two-population models. However, it turns out that
the constraint yields little difference in terms of evo-
lutionary outcomes. Despite the constraint, the two-
population model yields outcomes similar to those of
the single-population model if symmetric parameters are
used. Transitions between pure states different in both
trust and trustworthiness are possible in two steps; for
instance, one transition for different trust followed by
another transition for different trustworthiness. In other
words, any pure state is possible to be reached in two
one-step transitions and being unable to do it in a one-
step transition does not make much difference in terms
of evolutionary outcomes.
The two-population model of the asymmetric TG iron-
ically yields both simplicity and richness in the weak-
mutation limit. It leads to simpler fixation probabil-
ity that is frequency-independent and easy to compute.
It yields rich evolutionary outcomes at the same time.
Naturally inducing asymmetric parameters between the
populations, it can yield high trust and high trustworthi-
ness as well as low trust and low trustworthiness. This
contrasts to the single-population model that leads to
complex fixation probability and yet simpler evolution-
ary outcomes, unable to yield high trust and high trust-
worthiness.
The key assumption for the embedded Markov chain
over the pure states to validly approximate the evolu-
tionary dynamics is that the mutation rate is so small
that the populations are in pure or homogeneous states
most of the time. How small should the mutation rate
be? This can be experimentally answered by running
the individual-based simulation of the Moran process at
various mutation rates as we did with the rates of dif-
ferent orders of magnitude. The key criterion for the
mutation rate sufficiently small is whether the popula-
tion is in pure homogeneous states most of the time. Ac-
cording to our computer simulation results, the mutation
u = 10−4 is sufficiently small in that the populations are
in pure states for 98% of the total simulation periods or
generations as shown in Fig. 14. Even u = 10−3 can be
considered sufficiently small for practical purposes since
the population are in pure states for 82% of the simula-
tion periods. There is also an analytical alternative to
the experimental approach. Although derived for a sin-
gle population case, there is a threshold mutation rate
(N lnN)−1, where a mutation rate lower than it is con-
sidered small enough for the embedded Markov chain to
be a valid approximation [45]. For the threshold rate with
our simulations of the two-population system, we use the
total population size N = NI + NT = 50 + 10 = 60,
where NI and NT are the sizes of the investor population
and the trustee population, respectively. The threshold
mutation rate is (N lnN)−1 = (60 ln 60)−1 ≈ 4 × 10−3,
according to which u = 10−4 is small enough, whereas
u = 10−2 and u = 10−1 are not. The analytical approach
seems to match the experimental approach well.
By definition, the weak-mutation limit approach ap-
plies to only low mutation rates, where populations are
mostly in pure states and the simplified dynamics of the
Markov chain over the pure states well approximates the
evolutionary dynamics of the Moran process. For higher
mutation rates where the populations are not in pure
states but heterogeneous states (i.e. a mixture of differ-
ent strategies), the assumption for the Markov chain over
pure states is not met and the individual-based computer
simulation of the Moran process is instead used to study
the evolutionary dynamics of it [42][43]. If we summarise
a population state at a time with the most frequent strat-
egy in it, it applies to any mutation rates, unlike the pure
population state that applies to only low mutation rates.
At low mutation rates, the most frequent strategy in a
population is virtually the same as the pure state of a
population. Also, the distributions of the most frequent
strategy are similar to each other regardless of mutation
rates. This implies that the distribution of pure state pre-
dicted by the weak-mutation limit can also approximate
the distribution of the most frequent strategy regardless
of mutation rates. In other words, although it was orig-
inally devised to describe the distribution of pure state
at low mutation rates, the weak-mutation limit approach
can have its predictive power to describe distributions of
the most frequent strategy regardless of mutation rates.
If this conclusion also applies to other games (e.g. PD)
as well, it would mean that, regardless of mutation rates,
one can study the stochastic evolutionary dynamics us-
ing the distributions obtained from the weak-mutation
approach. This would be an interesting future work that
has potentially wide implications.
The asymmetric parameters in our two-population
model are of inter-population asymmetry but not intra-
population asymmetry. Whereas the selection strength
in one population is different from that in the other
population, for instance, the selection strength among
individuals in the same population is identical. Thus,
the (inter-population) asymmetry is not applicable to a
single-population model such as PD as well as the sym-
metric TG. However, we could also break the symmetry
or homogeneity of a parameter in a population, yield-
ing intra-population asymmetry. For instance, a portion
of individuals in a population can have a low selection
strength, whereas the remaining individuals in the same
population have a high selection strength. This intra-
population asymmetry of a parameter would then be ap-
plied to the single-population models as well. This would
be an interesting line of future work.
Rich evolutionary dynamics induced by asymmet-
ric parameters could be explored for other asymmetric
games such as the Ultimatum Game that was studied
with symmetric parameters only [32]. With asymmetric
parameters, it would be also interesting to analytically
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derive the modal strategy in the weak-selection limit and
study the condition for it to be high trust and high trust-
worthiness in the asymmetric TG. We hope that our work
paves a way to explore rich game dynamics with asym-
metric parameters.
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